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As of today, estimating interest rate reaction functions for the Euro Area is
hampered by the short time span since the conduct of a single monetary
policy. In this paper we circumvent the common use of aggregated data before
1999 by estimating interest rate reaction functions based on a panel including
actual EMU Member States. We nd that exploiting the cross-section dimen-
sion of a multi-country panel and accounting for cross-country heterogeneity in
advance of the single monetary policy pays o with regard to the estimated
reaction functions' ability to describe actual interest rate dynamics. We retrieve a
panel reaction function which is demonstrated to be a valuable tool for evaluating
episodes of monetary policy since 1999.
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JEL Classication: E43, E58, C33Non-Technical Summary
Estimating monetary policy reaction functions for the Euro Area has gained renewed
interest in academic research with Stage Three of the EMU. However, as of today,
estimating interest rate reaction functions for the European Central Bank (ECB) is
still hampered by the lack of suciently long area-wide time series since 1999.
This is why it is common in the literature to use aggregated, "synthetic" time
series for estimating reaction functions for the Euro Area. These reaction functions
are typically evaluated out-of-sample in order to assess their ability to describe interest
rate setting since 1999.
In this paper we circumvent the common use of "synthetic" data by estimating
interest rate reaction functions based on a panel including actual Member States of
the EMU. Applying panel techniques to country-specic data before 1999, we account
for cross-country heterogeneity in advance of the single monetary policy. Moreover, by
exploiting the cross-section dimension of a multi-country panel it is possible to shorten
the estimation sample. Excluding data from the eighties and starting with estimation
in 1993 (after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty) we avoid to base our analysis on a
period when monetary policy in most of the European countries was severely restricted
by the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM).
We nd that estimating interest rate reaction functions within a panel framework
pays o with regard to predicting short-term nominal interest rates since 1999. In par-
ticular, accounting for heterogeneous adjustment and short-run dynamics improves the
predictive ability of the estimated error-correction equations compared to alternative
equations estimated with aggregated data.
Finally, we demonstrate that the preferred panel reaction function might be a valu-
able tool for evaluating episodes of monetary policy since 1999.Nicht-technische Zusammenfassung
Die Sch atzung geldpolitischer Reaktionsfunktionen hat mit der Einf uhrung einer
gemeinsamen europ aischen Geldpolitik erneut an Bedeutung gewonnen. Die empirische
Ermittlung einer Zinsregel zur Beschreibung des geldpolitischen Handelns der Euro-
p aischen Zentralbank wird jedoch nach wie vor durch die geringe Anzahl von Beobach-
tungen f ur gesamteurop aische Zeitreihen seit 1999 erschwert.
 Ublicherweise wird diesem Problem durch die Verwendung aggregierter, "synthe-
tischer\ Zeitreihen vor 1999 begegnet. Dabei werden auf der Grundlage gewichteter
Durchschnitte l anderspezischer Zeitreihen Reaktionsfunktionen gesch atzt und deren
Erkl arungskraft f ur die Zinsentwicklung nach 1999 im Rahmen einer Out-of-Sample-
Evaluation  uberpr uft.
Ziel dieses Papiers ist die Vorstellung eines Panel-Ansatzes zur Sch atzung gesamt-
europ aischer Reaktionsfunktionen auf Grundlage von L anderdaten vor 1999. Im
Gegensatz zur Verwendung aggregierter Zeitreihen erlaubt die Anwendung von Panel-
Sch atztechniken, Heterogenit at zwischen den L andern im Vorfeld einer gemeinsamen
Geldpolitik zu ber ucksichtigen. Zudem erm oglicht der Panel-Ansatz, durch Ausnutzung
der Querschnittsdimension den Sch atzzeitraum auf die Zeit nach der Unterzeichnung
des Maastrichter Vertrages zu beschr anken. Im Gegensatz zu bisherigen Studien st utzt
sich die vorliegende Analyse somit nicht auf einen Zeitraum, in dem das geldpolitische
Handeln in vielen europ aischen L andern durch den europ aischen Wechselkursmechanis-
mus weitgehend beschr ankt war.
Die Anwendung von Panel-Sch atztechniken liefert plausible Reaktionsfunktionen,
die gute Prognoseeigenschaften aufweisen. Insbesondere werden Fehlerkorrektur-
Gleichungen ermittelt, die sich durch eine bessere Out-of-Sample Prognoseg ute aus-
zeichnen als alternative Reaktionsfunktionen, die auf Grundlage aggregierter Daten
gesch atzt wurden. Vor allem die Ber ucksichtigung heterogener Dynamik im Vorfeld
der gemeinsamen Geldpolitik scheint die Prognoseeigenschaften dieser Gleichungen zu
verbessern.
An einem Beispiel wird der m ogliche Einsatz der ermittelten Reaktionsfunktionen
zur Analyse von geldpolitischem Handeln nach 1999 veranschaulicht.Contents
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Evidence from Panel Data Analysis1
1 Introduction
Understanding interest rate setting in the Euro Area is crucial for evaluating actual
European monetary policy. This is why estimating policy reaction functions has gained
renewed interest in academic research with Stage Three of the EMU (see e.g. Gerlach
and Schnabel 2000; Gerdesmeier and Roa 2003; Gerlach-Kristen 2003; Adema 2004).
In particular, it turns out to be of considerable interest how country-specic interest
rate setting in the pre-EMU era relates to actual interest rate setting by the European
Central Bank (ECB). This is mainly due to the short time span since the conduct of a
single union-wide monetary policy which only allows to draw preliminary conclusions
from reaction functions exclusively estimated with data since 1999 (see e.g. Heinemann
and H ufner 2002; Sauer and Sturm 2003; Ullrich 2003).
Intending to relate actual interest rate setting to the historical experience dier-
ent methodological approaches have been pursued in the literature. First, there are
some studies which use aggregated, "synthetic" data for estimating a union-wide re-
action function in order to simulate a single monetary policy before 1999 (see e.g.
Gerdesmeier and Roa 2003; Gerlach-Kristen 2003). Second, there are some studies
which compare interest rate setting by the German Bundesbank before 1999 with in-
terest rate setting by the ECB afterwards (see e.g. Faust et al. 2001; Smant 2002; Hayo
and Hofmann 2003). Overall, these studies show that interest rate setting by the ECB
diers from the behavior predicted by a single "Bundesbank rule". In the same spirit,
Mihov (2001) argues that interest rate setting in the EMU can better be described by a
kind of pooled European policy rule than by a "Bundesbank rule" alone. His study dif-
fers from the aforementioned contributions since he draws on a pooled dataset instead
of using aggregated data.
1Author: Karsten Ruth, Goethe-University Frankfurt, Graduate Program "Finance and Monetary
Economics", Mertonstr. 17-21, 60054 Frankfurt (Main), Germany; E-mail: ruth@wiwi.uni-frankfurt.de.
The research for this paper was conducted while the author was visiting the Economic Research
Centre of the Deutsche Bundesbank. I would like to thank the Deutsche Bundesbank, especially
Heinz Herrmann, for kind hospitality. I thank J org Breitung, Sandra Eickmeier, Ralf Fendel,
Heinz Herrmann, Dieter Nautz and Christoph Winter for valuable comments on the paper.
Moreover, the paper beneted from discussions with participants of the research seminar at the
Deutsche Bundesbank. Needless to say, that all remaining errors are mine. The opinion expressed
in this paper does not necessarily re
ect the viewpoint of the Deutsche Bundesbank.
1This paper adds to the literature by investigating whether the application of panel
data techniques to country-specic data before 1999 improves the ability of historical
reaction functions to predict Euro Area interest rate setting since 1999. To this aim
we estimate union-wide reaction functions up to 1999 based on a panel including (up
to) ten actual Member States of the EMU. In contrast to Mihov (2001), we employ al-
ternative estimation techniques to account for both cross-country correlation as well as
cross-country heterogeneity. In line with the literature (e.g. Faust et al. 2001; Clausen
and Hayo 2002; Smant 2002), we assess the appropriateness of dierent panel reac-
tion functions by comparing the implied interest rate paths with euro interest rates
since 1999. Specically, we evaluate the out-of-sample forecast performance of the re-
action functions against a corresponding reaction function estimated with aggregated,
"synthetic" data.
A further contribution of our paper is that we explicitly account for potential non-
stationarity of interest rates and in
ation detected by panel unit root tests over the
sample under regard. Recent empirical research on Taylor-type rules has indicated that
reaction functions estimated in levels might suer from neglecting the non-stationarity
of the variables entering the rule (e.g.  Osterholm 2003; Christensen and Nielsen 2003).
For instance, Gerlach-Kristen (2003) found that a traditionally specied Taylor rule
for the Euro Area estimated in levels exhibited temporal instability and a bad out-of-
sample forecast performance. By contrast, augmented Taylor-type rules retrieved from
an error-correction equation did not show signs of misspecication and forecasted well.
We build on this research by translating the error-correction approach to the panel
framework.
Estimating a historical policy rule for a "ctitious" European central bank within
a panel framework might be advantageous for several reasons. First, we circumvent
the use of aggregated, "synthetic" data before the conduct of a single monetary policy.
Empirical results on union-wide pre-EMU policy rules estimated with aggregated data
might suer from implausible homogeneity restrictions imposed across countries. In
fact, estimating a union-wide reaction function with aggregated data restricts all model
parameters to be the same for all countries. In contrast, within the panel framework
it is possible to account for some cross-country heterogeneity while maintaining the
assumption of a common functional form of the policy rule for all countries. It should
be emphasized that it is just a particular characteristic of the panel approach that it
allows to relax the degree of homogeneity imposed across countries compared to using
aggregated data. This makes the panel framework desirable for estimating a union-wide
reaction function with data before 1999.
2Second, by exploiting the cross-section dimension of a multi-country panel we might
get more precise estimates of the policy rule parameters while, instantaneously, it is
possible to shorten the estimation sample compared to other studies. Starting with
estimation in 1993 (after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty) appears to be appro-
priate in the light of the beginning convergence process towards Stage Three of the
EMU. Moreover, by excluding data from the eighties we avoid to assume independent
monetary policy by all national authorities for a period which was characterized by a
far-reaching lack of monetary independence in most of the European countries due to
the asymmetric design of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). In contrast, assum-
ing a common European reaction function which presumes some monetary autonomy
in all European countries turns out to be justied with regard to the widening of the
exchange rate bands to 15% after the ERM crisis in 1992/93 (see Mihov 2001, p. 395).2
We nd that estimating interest rate reaction functions within a panel framework
pays o with regard to predicting short-term nominal interest rates since 1999. In
particular, accounting for heterogeneous adjustment and short-run dynamics improves
the predictive ability of the estimated reaction functions compared to the estimation
with aggregated data. Though we obtain very imprecise parameter estimates for the
equation based on "synthetic" data we observe a satisfactory out-of-sample perfor-
mance relative to the panel alternatives at short forecast horizons. By contrast, almost
all panel specications outperform the equation based on aggregated data at longer
horizons. Our preferred reaction function is a Taylor-type policy rule in line with the
Taylor-principle while exhibiting a lower output gap coecient than usually found in
the literature. This may be largely due to the inclusion of the long-term bond rate which
is argued to capture long-run in
ationary expectations. Finally, we demonstrate that
the preferred panel reaction function might be a valuable tool for evaluating episodes
of monetary policy since 1999.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives a brief survey of related literature
emphasizing the importance of historical reaction functions for evaluating monetary
policy since 1999. Furthermore, the employed estimation approaches are presented and
discussed. Section 3 summarizes our empirical results. At rst, we will illustrate the
existence of cross-country dierences by estimating country-specic reaction functions
before imposing a higher degree of homogeneity within the panel framework. We eval-
uate the panel reaction functions by comparing the out-of-sample performance with a
reaction function estimated with aggregated data. Furthermore, we use our preferred
reaction function for evaluating episodes of monetary policy since 1999. Finally, section
4 concludes.
2This is also in line with Wesche (2003) who nds for France and Italy that around 1993 there was
a switch to a monetary policy regime where the in
uence of German interest rate policy on domestic
policy decisions was no longer dominant.
32 Historical Reaction Functions for the Euro Area
2.1 Related Literature
In a recent paper Sauer and Sturm (2003) give a systematic survey of research on
reaction functions for the Euro Area. They classify three groups of studies. First, there
are studies which compare actual interest rate setting by the ECB with the hypothetical
path of a "Bundesbank rule" estimated up to 1998 (e.g. Clarida et al. 1998; Faust
et al. 2001; Smant 2002). These studies show that interest rate setting since 1999
remarkably deviates from the implied interest rate path retrieved from a historical
"Bundesbank rule".3 Second, a lot of studies present estimates of reaction functions
based on aggregated data for a "hypothetical" Euro Area before 1999 (e.g. Gerlach
and Schnabel 2000; Clausen and Hayo 2002). These reaction functions are generally
interpreted to re
ect a union-wide "average monetary policy" before the launch of the
Euro (see Gerdesmeier and Roa 2003, p. 39). As a key result these studies conclude
that Taylor-type policy rules are suitable to serve as a benchmark for understanding
and evaluating monetary policy in the Euro Area (see also Peersman and Smets 1999;
Taylor 1999). In particular, it is emphasized that there are no indications that monetary
policy was subject to a structural break in 1999 (see Clausen and Hayo 2002; Gerlach-
Kristen 2003). This nding conrms that insights on interest rate setting from the
pre-EMU era are valuable for understanding actual monetary policy.
Finally, there is some recent research on Euro Area reaction functions exclusively
based on data since 1999 (e.g. Heinemann and H ufner 2002; Sauer and Sturm 2003;
Ullrich 2003; Fendel and Frenkel 2004). However, these authors are keen to emphasize
the preliminary character of their empirical results due to the short time span since
the conduct of a single monetary policy. This indicates that, for the time being, there
remains the necessity to relate actual interest rate setting to the historical pre-EMU
experience.
Apart from the aforementioned contributions there are only two studies which deal
with pooled datasets before 1999: in order to increase the number of (annual) observa-
tions Wyplosz (1999) estimates various reaction functions based on a panel of eleven
European countries within the sample 1982{1997. His results conrm the existence of
a systematic relationship between the short-term nominal interest rate, in
ation and
the output gap in the Euro Area. More directly related to our paper is a study by
Mihov (2001) who presents a pooled policy rule estimated on a dataset including data
for Germany, France and Italy. He also compares the implied interest rate path with
3One exception is the study by Surico (2003) who detects similarity between the Bundesbank and
the ECB behavior described by a non-linear reaction function.
4interest rates since 1999 and concludes that interest rate setting in the Euro Area can
better be described by a pooled policy rule building on a "collective experience" than
by a "Bundesbank rule" alone.
Our paper seeks to advance on the idea of retrieving additional information from
a pooled dataset by facing some of the problems prevalent in the studies above: in
contrast to Wyplosz (1999) who estimated a level specication we employ an error-
correction approach to account for indications of non-stationarity of the variables en-
tering the reaction function over the sample under regard (see Gerlach-Kristen 2003).
Furthermore, by excluding data of the eighties we avoid the critical assumption of
a common union-wide reaction function for a period when monetary autonomy was
severely restricted by the ERM.
Mihov (2001) also chooses the start of his sample period at the beginning of the
nineties but he only focuses on three member countries of the EMU. Furthermore, by
performing a standard pooled estimation he does not allow for cross-country hetero-
geneity. In the light of remarkable cross-country dierences in economic conditions
at the beginning of the convergence process both considering more countries and ac-
counting for country-specic eects appears to be desirable when estimating a reaction
function based on panel data.
2.2 Econometric Specication
2.2.1 Pooled/Fixed-Eects Estimation (SUR)
Traditionally, interest rate rules of the form introduced by Taylor (1993) are estimated
in levels. However, the estimated equations often display pronounced serial correlation
in the residuals (see Gerlach and Schnabel 2000). This is why one lag of the interest
rate is often included as additional regressor (see e.g. Clarida et al. 1998). The highly
signicant impact of the lagged interest rate is usually interpreted to re
ect interest
rate smoothing, i.e. the central bank's willingness to adjust interest rates gradually in
order to signal continuity of monetary policy to the public.
However, the observed persistence in interest rates might also indicate that inter-
est rates follow (near) unit root processes. For instance, one common characteristic
of estimated level specications supporting this viewpoint is a very large R2-value
(typically above 0.95) which sharply declines when excluding the lagged interest rate
(see Gerdesmeier and Roa 2003, p. 28). This is why there is a growing literature
on Taylor-type policy rules which emphasizes the potential pitfalls of level specica-
tions arising from the non-stationarity of the variables entering the reaction function
5(see e.g.  Osterholm 2003; Christensen and Nielsen 2003).4
In this paper we pursue an error-correction approach to the Taylor rule, following
Judd and Rudebusch (1998) as well as Gerlach-Kristen (2003). Dynamic modeling of
the Taylor rule within an error-correction framework is desirable for mainly two rea-
sons. First, it allows to account for interest rate smoothing through partial adjustment
(Judd and Rudebusch 1998). Second, it allows to avoid potential misspecication aris-
ing from neglected non-stationarity of the variables entering the policy rule. This was
recently emphasized by Gerlach-Kristen (2003) who proposed to consider Taylor-type
policy rules within a cointegration framework. Since panel unit root tests indicate
potential non-stationarity of interest rates and in
ation over the sample under regard
(see section 3.1) accounting for the possibility of cointegration appears to be appro-
priate. In fact, considering a Taylor-type policy rule as a long-run (equilibrium) re-
lationship is in line with the concept of the target rate. Assuming the target rate
to be described by the policy rule, misalignments should be corrected gradually via
endogenous changes of the central bank's instrument, i.e. the short-term nominal in-
terest rate. Overall, the error-correction approach provides a very general framework
to capture interest rate dynamics.5
Augmenting the traditional Taylor rule, Gerlach-Kristen (2003) nds a signicant
role of the long-term nominal interest rate which is assumed to re
ect the public's
long-run in
ationary expectations.6 Including the long-term bond rate in the reaction
function in order to capture (long-run) in
ationary expectations was also proposed by
Mehra (2001) who showed that the explanatory power of Taylor rules estimated for
the U.S. increases when including the long rate. Moreover, Goodfriend (1998) already
argued that e.g. the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank reacted to movements of the long-term
bond rate which were interpreted as changes in the public's in
ationary scares. Thus,
including the long-term bond rate augments the contemporaneous policy rule by a
forward-looking component.7
4Surprisingly, a lot of empirical studies in other research elds { like in the literature on exchange
rates or money demand { conrm the non-stationarity of interest rates (see e.g. MacDonald and Taylor
1994) and in
ation (see e.g. Coenen and Vega 2001). However, these insights are usually neglected in
the literature on policy rules.
5In the light of con
icting evidence concerning the integration properties of the variables it should
be emphasized that the error-correction approach does not demand the variables to be non-stationary.
This is because the error-correction equations { being simple reparametrizations of level specications {
are only required to be balanced, see Johnston and DiNardo 1997, chpt.8 and Pesaran et al. 1999,
p. 625. For an application of the error-correction approach to the Taylor rule which does not rely on
non-stationarity of the variables see Judd and Rudebusch (1998, especially footnote 10).
6For a theoretical justication see e.g. Kozicki and Tinsley (2001)
7In the same spirit, Surico (2003) uses the 10-year government bond yield as instrument for in
a-
tionary expectations.
6Specically, Gerlach-Kristen (2003) identies a cointegrating relation between the
short-term nominal interest rate (r), year-on-year in
ation (), the output gap (y) and
the long-term nominal interest rate (l) of the form
rt = 1t + 2yt + 3lt (1)
In the spirit of the two-step approach proposed by Engle and Granger (1987), de-
viations from (1) enter an error-correction equation estimated in a second step as dis-
equilibrium term. Eventually, this error-correction equation is found to exhibit desirable
stability and forecasting properties.
In contrast to Gerlach-Kristen (2003), we employ a one-step approach for estimating
the long-run relationship (1), following Stock (1987). More specically, we estimate the
following equation:8
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1ii;t 1 + 2iyi;t 1 + 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where i = 1;:::;N denotes the dierent cross-section units (i.e. countries) and t =
1;::::;T captures the time period. x denotes a vector of additional exogenous regressors,
e.g. foreign interest rates (see section 3.2), and (lagged) dierences of the variables enter
the equation to remove potential autocorrelation. Moreover, allowing for very general
dynamics by including (lagged) dierences we account for potential endogeneity9 which
allows to estimate (2) by OLS.10 Thus, from (2) we retrieve the coecients of the long-
run relation rit = 1iit + 2iyit + 3ilit as ki =  ki=i;8 k = 1;2;3 and i = 1;:::;N.
8Due to the sucient number of time series observations (T = 72), the bias arising through the
lagged dependent variable (Nickell-Bias) can be assumed to be negligible, see Judson and Owen (1999).
9However, endogeneity is not likely to be an issue in our context: treating the output gap and
in
ation as weakly exogenous is widely accepted in the literature on Taylor-type interest rate rules.
Moreover, there are empirical studies which show that the impact of anticipated short rate movements
on long-term interest rates with maturities of several years is negligible which justies to treat the bond
rate also as exogenous, see e.g. Nautz and Wolters (1999).
10OLS estimation of comparable error-correction equations was also performed by Judd and Rude-
busch (1998) or Clausen and Meier (2003).
7Depending on the degree of imposed homogeneity we can assume dierent shapes
of the parameter vector 	i: we can restrict all parameters to be equal across countries
(pooled estimation, i.e. 	i = 	p where 	p = [;;k;
;
j;(k)
j ]0), we can account
for country-specic eects captured by dierent intercepts (xed-eects estimation,
i.e. 	i = 	f where 	f = [i;;k;
;
j;(k)
j ]0) or we can allow all parameters to
dier within a Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) framework (i.e. 	i = 	SUR =
[i;i;ki;
i;
ij;(k)
ij ]0). Note, that in the latter case the SUR approach constitutes
a dierence to estimating equation (2) separately for each country by OLS. This is
because the SUR estimation accounts for cross-country interrelationships (i.e. contem-
poraneous correlation) even when countries are treated as completely heterogeneous
(see section 3.2).11
2.2.2 Pooled Mean Group Estimation
According to Pesaran et al. (1999), the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimation tech-
nique for dynamic heterogeneous panels represents an intermediate case between the
Mean Group (MG) estimation and the traditional pooled estimation techniques (xed
and random eects). While the MG estimation averages coecients to obtain means of
parameter estimates for heterogeneous cross-section units, the pooled estimation tech-
niques assume overall homogeneity (at least) for the slope coecients. In contrast, the
PMG estimator only imposes homogeneity for a structural long-run relationship which
is assumed to exist for all cross-section units. By contrast, the short-run dynamics are
allowed to dier across groups. Thus, by only restricting the long-run slope coecients
to be the same across groups the PMG estimator "allows us to estimate this common
long-run coecient without making the less plausible assumption of identical dynamics
in each country" (Pesaran et al. 1999, p. 621).
We employ this alternative method since it turns out to be well suited when seeking
to estimate a common European policy rule before 1999: on the one hand the long-run
homogeneity restrictions establish the assumption of a common structural relationship
between interest rates, in
ation and the output gap which appears appropriate in the
light of structural convergence in advance of the single monetary policy. On the other
hand, the adjustment and short-run dynamics remain unrestricted across countries
which appears desirable with regard to dierences in monetary and economic condi-
tions observed at the beginning of the convergence process. To end up with a common
level of interest rates in 1999 one would expect dierent speeds of adjustment towards
11The SUR procedure was introduced by Zellner (1962) and is well suited for the analysis of multi-
country panels which typically consist of few countries (N small) which are observed over a longer time
span (T large).
8equilibrium across countries, given homogeneous long-run responsiveness to the vari-
ables entering the policy rule. This is because countries with a high level of interest
rates are forced to re-establish the equilibrium relatively faster than countries which
are almost near the common interest rate level.
Starting point for the PMG estimation of the policy rule (1) is an autoregressive
distributed lag equation [ARDL(~ p; ~ q1; ~ q2; ~ q3)] of the form:
rit = ~ i +
~ p X
j=1
~ ijri;t j +
~ q1 X
j=0
~ 
(1)
ij i;t j +
~ q2 X
j=0
~ 
(2)
ij yi;t j +
~ q3 X
j=0
~ 
(3)
ij li;t j + it (3)
Re-parametrization of (3) yields the error-correction equation:12
rit = ~ i + ~ iri;t 1 + ~ 1iit + ~ 2iyit + ~ 3ilit + ~ 
i
0xit
+
~ p 1 X
j=1
~ 
ijri;t j +
~ q1 1 X
j=0
~ 
(1)
ij i;t j +
~ q2 1 X
j=0
~ 
(2)
ij yi;t j +
~ q3 1 X
j=0
~ 
(3)
ij li;t j + it
= ~ i + ~ i(ri;t 1   ~ 1iit   ~ 2iyit   ~ 3ilit) + ~ 
i
0xit
+
~ p 1 X
j=1
~ 
ijri;t j +
~ q1 1 X
j=0
~ 
(1)
ij i;t j +
~ q2 1 X
j=0
~ 
(2)
ij yi;t j +
~ q3 1 X
j=0
~ 
(3)
ij li;t j + it
(4)
where ~ i =  (1  
P~ p
j=1 ~ ij), ~ ki =
P~ qk
j=0 ~ 
(k)
ij and ~ ki = ( ~ ki=~ i); k = f1;2;3g.
Assuming the equation in (4) to be stable for all countries we know that all error-
correction coecients will be negative, i.e. ~ i < 0, 8 i = 1;::::;N. Again, we retrieve
the long-run policy rule as:
rit = ( ~ 1i=~ i)it + ( ~ 2i=~ i)yit + ( ~ 3i=~ i)lit
= ~ 1iit + ~ 2iyit + ~ 3ilit
(5)
As mentioned above, the particular characteristic of the PMG estimator is that
it restricts the long-run coecients to be the same across countries; i.e. ki = k,
8 i = 1;:::;N and k = f1;2;3g, while leaving the adjustment and short-run dynamics
12Note, that the time indices for ;y and l dier compared to equation (2) in order to capture the
special case of an ARDL(1;0;::;0) equation. However, this does not harm the interpretation of (4) as
error-correction equation; see Pesaran et al. 1999, p. 627.
9unrestricted. Thus, by applying the PMG estimation technique we impose a smaller
degree of homogeneity across countries compared to a pooled/xed-eects estimation
as discussed in section 2.2.1.13
3 Empirical Results
3.1 Data
We use monthly data within the estimation sample 1993:1{1998:12. The out-of-sample
evaluation period is chosen as 1999:1{2002:12. Country-specic data was fetched from
the International Financial Statistics (IFS) provided by the International Monetary
Fund (IMF). The call money rate (or money market rate with shortest maturity) was
chosen as short-term nominal interest rate, while for the long-term nominal interest
rate we took the government bond yield.14;15
In order to nd support for the assumption that the long-term bond rate is a good
measure for long-run in
ationary expectations we compared the series with an alter-
native measure taken from survey data. The London-based rm Consensus Economics
provides long-term forecasts of in
ation. These forecasts summarize the long-term in-

ation forecasts of several professional forecast institutions by means of an unweighted
average.16 Unfortunately, Consensus (long-term) Forecasts are only available for a limi-
ted number of European countries and for a small sample at semi-annual frequency.
Thus, we cannot perform our whole panel estimation with this alternative measure
of long-run in
ationary expectations. Nevertheless, we can investigate the similarity
between both measures for a selected number of countries. Semi-annual observations
for the 6-to-10-year in
ation forecast17 were converted to monthly frequency by linear
interpolation. Thus, the survey measure exhibits less variation compared to the long
rate by construction. However, visual inspection of the (normalized) series for Ger-
many, France and Italy yields that both series exhibit a remarkably similar downward
movement between 1994:1{1998:12. Overall, this might give some further support to
the assumption that the long-term bond rate is a valid proxy for capturing long-run
in
ationary expectations.
13However, one shortcoming of this approach compared to the approach discussed in section 2.2.1
is the assumption of independent countries with regard to the residual structure. A natural way to
deal with cross-country correlation within the PMG framework is to include an additional regressor
which impacts all countries, thereby controlling for common eects, see Pesaran et al. 1999, p. 622. We
introduce such a global exogenous variable in section 3.2, see also footnote 24.
14Missing observations for Finland (1996:8{1998:10) were added using the respective time series from
the OECD statistics.
15Graphs of the country-specic time series are shown in Appendix A.
16For details on Consensus Economics and its forecasts visit http://www.consensuseconomics.com.
17I would like to thank Christina Gerberding and Christian Upper for providing me with the data.
10Figure 1: Alternative Measures of In
ationary Expectations (normalized series):
Government Bond Yield vs. Consensus Long-Term Forecasts
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Year-on-year in
ation was computed as the annual growth rate of the Consumer
Price Index (base year 1995).18 In order to construct a measure for the output gap,
potential output was calculated applying the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) lter with smooth-
ing parameter hp = 14400 to the seasonally adjusted (log) Industrial Production (IP)
index series.
In line with Fagan et al. (2001), aggregated European data before 1999 were calcu-
lated using 1995 GDP/PPP-weights (rescaled for the omission of Luxembourg). From
1999 onwards we use area-wide variables obtained from the Euro Area Statistics (EAS)
provided by the ECB. In
ation was computed as the annual change of the European
Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) while, again, potential output was cal-
culated applying the HP lter to the (log) IP index. As short-term nominal interest
rate we took the EONIA-rate while the 10-year-government bond yield was taken as
long-term nominal interest rate.
In order to test for stationarity of the series within the panel framework we applied
both the test procedure proposed by Im et al. (2003) (IPS test) and alternatively the
test introduced by Levin et al. (2002) (LLC test).19
Table 1 reports the test results (based on a common lag length of m = 4).20 Interest
rates and in
ation turn out to be integrated of order one, i.e. I(1), over the sample
under consideration while the output gap is stationary by construction.21 However,
the latter point does not con
ict with our estimation approaches as long as interest
rates and in
ation constitute a (stationary) cointegrating relation which would ensure
a balanced regression (see footnote 5).
18Due to data limitations, for Ireland, we took the quarterly CPI series from the OECD statistics
and converted it to monthly frequency by quadratic interpolation (averages).
19Panel unit root tests were performed using STATA 8.
20It is a well-known observation that the test results of (panel) unit root tests can crucially depend
on the choice of the lag structure. In fact, over the sample under consideration there is some indication
for interest rates and in
ation to be near stationary when varying the lag length.
21Including a time trend in the (level) test equations for r; l and  did not yield qualitatively dierent
results.
11Table 1: Panel Unit Root Tests 1993:1{1998:12
IPS test LLC test
level 1st di. level 1st di.
 W t =  1:18 W t =  9:16 t =  1:28 t =  12:51
l W t =  0:46 W t =  8:81 t =  1:59 t =  10:79
r W t = 0:39 W t =  13:15 t = 6:23 t =  16:07
y W t =  4:25 { t =  9:84 {
Notes: W t and t
 denote the test statistics of the IPS and the LLC unit root test
which are both asymptotically standard normally distributed under the null. A
constant is included as deterministics for all specications but the LLC-test on rst
dierences and the output gap.
 denotes signicance at the 1%-level.
We applied the residual-based panel cointegration test by Kao (1999) to test for
cointegration between the short rate, in
ation and the long rate. The test clearly
rejects the null of no cointegration with a test statistic of tADF =  9:36. This conrms
that there exists a cointegrating relationship between interest rates and in
ation.
In order to investigate whether there is potentially more than one cointegrating
relation (e.g. a Fisher relation and a term spread) we applied the likelihood-based
panel cointegration test by Larsson et al. (2001). This test builds on Johansen's mul-
tivariate cointegration rank test by focusing on the standardized mean of individual
trace-statistics calculated separately for each cross-section unit. Under the null we
observe the same (maximum) cointegration rank cr for all countries. Since we included
a constant as deterministics in the vector error-correction model (VECM) the mean
of the country-specic trace-statistics was standardized using the asymptotic values
simulated by Breitung (2004). We obtain an (asymptotically standard normally dis-
tributed) test statistic of   LR = 5:15 for the hypothesis cr = 0 which allows to reject
the null of no cointegration at the 1%-level. In contrast, we cannot reject the null of
at most one cointegrating relation since we obtain a test statistic of   LR =  0:59 for
cr  1.22 Thus, we nd evidence for a cointegration rank of cr = 1 among interest
rates and in
ation.23
22These results are based on a lag length (for the VECM) of  p   1 = 4. Varying the lag length or
the formation of the panel did not yield qualitatively dierent results.
23Note, that the fact that there is no indication for a cointegration rank of cr = 3 supports our
conjecture that the variables are non-stationary over the sample under regard.
123.2 Illustrating Heterogeneity:
Country-Specic Reaction Functions (SUR)
An illustrative exercise when dealing with the task of cross-country heterogeneity
is to estimate, in a rst step, country-specic reaction functions based on equation
(2). Thereby, we can get an impression about the extent of existing heterogeneity
which becomes hidden when imposing a higher degree of homogeneity by performing a
pooled/xed-eects estimation. Specically, we estimated (2) applying the SUR tech-
nique. We included up to six lagged dierences to ensure serially uncorrelated residuals
in each country-specic equation.
In line with Clarida et al. (1998) or Mihov (2001) we account for the asymmetric
design of the ERM by including the German short-term nominal interest rate as ad-
ditional regressor x in the reaction functions of all European countries but Germany
for which we included the U.S. Federal Funds Rate. Thus, this variable can be inter-
preted to capture the "external constraint" (see Clarida et al. 1998, p. 1046) domestic
monetary policy was subject to.24 We denote this variable as rext. Due to the non-
stationarity of German and U.S. interest rates detected by conventional ADF-tests (not
reported) rext enters in rst dierences (with a time lag of one month). Thus, changes
in the domestic policy instrument have two potential sources: domestic economic con-
ditions and changes in a foreign policy instrument. In general, we would assume that
the higher the impact of rext
t 1 the less monetary policy reacted to domestic economic
conditions (see Mihov 2001, p. 394).
Table 2 summarizes the results: rst, it is noteworthy that the estimated adjustment
coecients (^ i) are signicant for all countries but Spain and France (for which we
observe signicance at least at the 10% level) and show the expected negative sign.
Moreover, we can observe pronounced dierences in the coecients' magnitude varying
between  0:039 (Germany) and  0:322 (Portugal). This conrms our conjecture from
above that, in advance of Stage Three of the EMU, we could observe dierent speeds
of adjustment towards the target interest rate across European countries.
Considering the estimates for the coecients ki it becomes apparent that they are
often very imprecise: we only obtain signicant estimates for the in
ation coecient
of Finland (0.998), Germany (1.094), Italy (0:693) and Portugal (1:119) which are
comparable in magnitude with previous empirical ndings on Taylor rules (see Sauer
and Sturm 2003; p. 10). Nevertheless, the coecients appear to be slightly below the
values usually found in the literature which indicates that by including the long rate
24By introducing a global variable like the "external constraint"-variable we abandon to include time
dummy variables in our estimation.
13Table 2: Country-Specic Reaction Functions (SUR) 1993:1{1998:12
Country ^ i ^ 1i ^ 1i () ^ 2i ^ 2i (y) ^ 3i ^ 3i (l) ^ 
i
Austria  0:090

0:020
0:043
0:035
0:477
0:357
0:005
0:007
0:050
0:085
0:001
0:028
0:012
0:315
0:442

0:133
Belgium  0:056

0:027
0:001
0:070
0:018
1:251
 0:003
0:012
 0:060
0:841
 0:017
0:047
 0:304
0:397
 0:587
0:322
Netherlands  0:043

0:015
0:057
0:041
1:347
0:828
0:017

0:008
0:407
0:292
 0:015
0:021
 0:347
0:535
0:365

0:128
Finland  0:132

0:032
0:132

0:041
0:998

0:279
0:024

0:011
0:183

0:090
0:049

0:023
0:132

0:041
0:202
0:230
France  0:055
0:029
0:036
0:103
0:641
1:895
0:025
0:028
0:460
0:644
0:055
0:067
0:986
1:025
1:036

0:398
Italy  0:278

0:047
0:193

0:047
0:693

0:156
0:039

0:015
0:142

0:054
0:132

0:034
0:474

0:079
0:189
0:296
Germany  0:039

0:019
0:043
0:026
1:094

0:468
0:034

0:009
0:879
0:500
 0:025
0:022
 0:629
0:738
 0:178
0:097
Portugal  0:322

0:100
0:360

0:114
1:119

0:368
0:043
0:031
0:135
0:114
0:132
0:089
0:411

0:191
0:023
0:801
Spain  0:070
0:039
 0:067
0:071
 0:947
1:209
0:033
0:022
0:464
0:525
0:131

0:049
1:864
1:351
0:787

0:398
Ireland  0:254

0:059
0:602
0:331
2:367
1:430
0:032
0:048
0:124
0:190
 0:117
0:200
 0:458
0:818
 0:069
1:882
Notes: Column 1 denotes the country under regard. Column 2 shows the estimates for the adjustment
coecient (^ i). Columns 4,6,8 summarize the estimates for the long-run coecients (^ ki) which are
retrieved from the ^ ki-coecients (standard errors for ^ ki are computed by the delta method). The last
column (^ 
i) reports the estimated coecients for r
ext
t 1.
(
) denotes signicance at the 5%(1%)-level.
in our reaction function we split up the in
ation coecient in a contemporaneous (1)
and a forward-looking part (3) (see Gerlach-Kristen 2003, p. 15).25
This is supported in the three cases where the long-run coecients for the long rate
are signicant: adding both coecients for Finland yields an overall in
ation coe-
cient of ^ 1 + ^ 3 = 0:998 + 0:373 = 1:371, while for Italy we get 0:693 + 0:474 = 1:167
and for Portugal 1:119 + 0:411 = 1:530. With an (overall) in
ation coecient above 1
these reaction functions are in line with the Taylor-principle by indicating that the real
rate is raised when in
ation increases.26 The signicant long-run coecients for the
output gap are in a range between 0:142 (Italy) and 0:183 (Finland). Finally, the "ex-
ternal constraint"-variable enters the reaction functions of four countries signicantly.
Especially the signicant in
uence for Austria and the Netherlands supports the inter-
pretation of the variable since these countries closely tied their interest rate decisions
to German monetary policy.
25This is in line with Christensen and Nielsen (2003, p. 4) who argue that it is the real bond rate
which captures "new" information about in
ationary expectations. Thereby, the coecient for the
nominal bond rate 3 captures this "new" information and is subtracted from the "overall" in
ation
coecient  1 which would have been estimated without inclusion of the bond rate l:
rt =  1t + 2yt + 3(lt   t) = (  1   3)t + 2yt + 3lt.
26In the literature on Taylor-type rules the magnitude of the in
ation coecient is typically considered
to be "an important yardstick for evaluating a central bank's policy rule" (see Clarida et al. 1998,
p. 1037). However, whether an in
ation coecient above 1 in fact implies a stabilizing policy ultimately
will depend on the macroeconomic model under regard.
14Summarizing, the disaggregate analysis provided empirical results which support
plausible reaction functions for some countries. Nevertheless, we are confronted with a
lot of very imprecise estimates which may be due to the limited number of observations
for each country. This is why in the following we will exploit the cross-section dimension
of our multi-country panel by means of a pooled/xed-eects estimation.
3.3 Panel Reaction Functions
3.3.1 Pooled/Fixed-Eects Estimation (SUR): Results
We now impose a higher degree of cross-country homogeneity by estimating equation
(2) within a pooled/xed-eects framework. This means that all coecients are either
restricted to be the same across countries (pooled) or that the intercepts are allowed
to vary in order to capture country-specic eects while assuming homogeneity of the
slope coecients (xed-eects), see section 2.2.1.
Again, we started with six lagged dierences before removing insignicant lags. In
addition to estimating (2) within a pooled/xed-eects framework (with SUR weight-
ing) we also performed an estimation based on aggregated data (see section 3.1). This
allows to detect potential advantages of estimating a historical European reaction func-
tion within a panel framework compared to the standard approach of using "synthetic"
data. Table 3 summarizes the results: the upper panel shows the results obtained from
the pooled, the xed-eects and the aggregated estimation with the complete set of
variables.
Table 3: Pooled/Fixed-Eects Estimation (SUR) vs. Estimation with Aggregated Data
1993:1{1998:12
^  ^ 1 ^ 1 () ^ 2 ^ 2 (y) ^ 3 ^ 3 (l) ^ 

pooled  0:070

0:008
0:041

0:010
0:582

0:126
0:012

0:004
0:165

0:067
0:024

0:009
0:338

0:108
0:171

0:059
xed-eects  0:082

0:009
0:049

0:013
0:594

0:140
0:011

0:004
0:139

0:056
0:025

0:010
0:299

0:116
0:126

0:063
aggregated  0:079

0:028
0:071
0:078
0:894
0:866
0:007
0:018
0:092
0:244
0:024
0:032
0:303
0:383
0:456

0:147
pooled  0:059

0:007
0:042

0:010
0:716

0:137
0:015

0:004
0:257

0:075
    0:164

0:059
xed-eects  0:072

0:008
0:056

0:013
0:773

0:133
0:014

0:004
0:199

0:060
    0:131

0:063
aggregated  0:073

0:027
0:104

0:065
1:425

0:488
0:016
0:014
0:218
0:224
    0:471

0:146
Notes: Column 1 denotes the estimation approach under regard. Column 2 shows the estimate for the
adjustment coecient (^ ). Columns 4,6,8 summarize the estimates for the long-run coecients (^ k)
which are retrieved from the ^ k-coecients (standard errors for ^ k are computed by the delta method).
The last column (^ 
) reports the estimated coecient for r
ext
t 1. The upper and the lower panel dier
with regard to the inclusion of the long-term nominal interest rate l.
(
) denotes signicance at the
5%(1%)-level.
15We can observe that the results for the pooled and the xed-eects estimation are
very similar.27 The estimated adjustment coecients (^ ) are signicant at the 1%-level
and the negative sign conrms the prevalence of an error-correction mechanism. In ad-
dition, all long-run coecients are highly signicant and show the expected positive
sign. This means that the short-term nominal rate is raised when in
ation, the output
gap or the long-term nominal rate rises. However, the estimated long-run coecients
are slightly lower than usually found in the literature. In particular, the sum of the
coecients on in
ation (^ 1) and the long rate (^ 3) is close but below 1. The coecient
for the "external constraint"-variable (^ 
) is estimated signicantly positive which con-
rms that positive changes of this variable also lead to positive changes of the domestic
policy instrument. Overall, it becomes apparent that we get very precise estimates
from the pooled/xed-eects estimation.28
In contrast, only the adjustment coecient and the 
-coecient turn out to be
signicant in the estimation with aggregated data.29 Nevertheless, the long-run coe-
cients show the expected positive sign and the magnitude of the in
ation and the output
coecient are comparable with previous empirical ndings. However, the estimates are
very imprecise.
In order to support the argumentation that the single in
ation coecient usually
estimated for reaction functions is split up by including the long rate we re-estimated
the equations without the long rate.30 For the panel estimations the results strikingly
support our interpretation: the eect of the long rate almost completely feeds in the
in
ation and the output coecient while all other coecients remain largely unchanged.
Considering the xed-eects results, the sum of the increase in the in
ation coecient
(0.179) and the output gap coecient (0.060) almost equals the estimated long-run
coecient of the long rate from before (0.299). While the bulk feeds in the in
ation
coecient the slight increase in ^ 2 is in accordance with the usual interpretation of the
output gap as being a leading indicator for future in
ation (see Judd and Rudebusch
1998, p. 6).
27This is in line with an F-test (p=0.42) on the joint hypothesis that all country-specic intercept
terms are equal to zero.
28One exception are the parameter estimates for the constant. Throughout this paper we will not
report estimates for the constant which were found to be insignicant. Though we are aware that
the constant of Taylor-type rules contains information about the underlying equilibrium real interest
rate and/or the in
ation target, we argue that it is not possible to reveal valuable information from
insignicant estimates, see Gerlach-Kristen (2003, p. 11).
29For the estimation with aggregated data we used the U.S. Federal Funds Rate as "external
constraint"-variable.
30According to the cointegration tests, the inclusion of the long rate is important for the non-
stationary variables to be cointegrated. Thus, estimation results without the long rate { although
illustrative { should be interpreted with caution.
16Finally, we investigated whether our results are sensitive to the formation of the
panel by considering results for two sub-panels. It could be argued that, with regard
to the panel estimation, the low coecient on in
ation results from the inclusion of
countries which did not pursue an active monetary policy. This is why we rst ex-
cluded Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands from our panel. Furthermore, following
Mihov (2001), we also considered a sub-panel consisting of the three largest economies
Germany, France and Italy.
Table 4: Fixed-Eects Estimation (SUR) of Sub-Panels 1993:1{1998:12
Panel ^  ^ 1 ^ 1 () ^ 2 ^ 2 (y) ^ 3 ^ 3 (l) ^ 

all countries  0:082

0:009
0:049

0:013
0:594

0:140
0:011

0:004
0:139

0:056
0:025

0:010
0:299

0:116
0:126

0:063
without  0:097

0:011
0:089

0:017
0:917

0:140
0:023

0:006
0:238

0:073
0:027

0:011
0:283

0:107
 0:008
0:084
Aut/Bel/Net
only with  0:074

0:015
0:082

0:024
1:112

0:243
0:030

0:009
0:403

0:158
0:009
0:015
0:127
0:201
 0:138
0:098
Ger/Fra/Ita
Notes: Column 1 shows the sub-panel under regard. Column 2 shows the estimate for the adjustment
coecient (^ ). Columns 4,6,8 summarize the estimates for the long-run coecients (^ k) which are
retrieved from the ^ k-coecients (standard errors for ^ k are computed by the delta method). The
last column (^ 
) reports the estimated coecient for r
ext
t 1. Note, that the results in the upper panel
are the same as in the second line of Table 3.
(
) denotes signicance at the 5%(1%)-level.
Table 4 summarizes the results. In fact, when considering the sub-panel where
Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands are omitted, the long-run coecient for in
ation
(^ 1) increases. Moreover, the in
uence of the variable rext
t 1 (^ 
) becomes insignicant.
These observations are completely consistent with both our assumption that rext
t 1
captures external constraints on domestic monetary policy as well as the conjecture
that the low in
ation coecients reported in Table 3 might be due to the inclusion
of countries without active monetary policy. Finally, when only including Germany,
France and Italy in the panel, the in
ation coecient further increases. A possible
explanation for this observation would be that the reaction function exhibits a stronger
reaction to in
ation the larger the relative importance of Germany within the panel
estimation becomes. However, since the coecient of the long rate declines and becomes
insignicant this interpretation remains vague.
3.3.2 Pooled Mean Group Estimation: Results
We proceed by estimating equation (4) applying the PMG estimation technique dis-
cussed in section 2.2.2. Note that, in contrast to the procedure above, we now allow
both the adjustment dynamics and the short-run dynamics to vary across countries
17while, again, the (long-run) policy rule is restricted to be the same for all countries.
The country-specic lag structure was chosen automatically by the Akaike Information
Criterion (AIC). Optimization of the log-likelihood function was performed applying
the Newton-Raphson-method and using the mean group estimates as initial values.31
Table 5: Pooled Mean Group Estimation 1993:1{1998:12 (Country-Specic)
Country ^ ~ i
^ ~ 1 () ^ ~ 2 (y) ^ ~ 3 (l) ^ ~ 
i
Austria  0:067

0:024
0:636

0:101
0:099

0:038
0:518

0:050
0:475

0:140
Belgium  0:057
0:030
0:636

0:101
0:099

0:038
0:518

0:050
 0:353
0:283
Netherlands  0:059

0:018
0:636

0:101
0:099

0:038
0:518

0:050
0:450

0:134
Finland  0:110

0:028
0:636

0:101
0:099

0:038
0:518

0:050
0:314

0:117
France  0:104

0:030
0:636

0:101
0:099

0:038
0:518

0:050
0:291
0:362
Italy  0:201

0:058
0:636

0:101
0:099

0:038
0:518

0:050
0:230
0:198
Germany  0:054

0:019
0:636

0:101
0:099

0:038
0:518

0:050
 0:067
0:198
Portugal  0:361

0:075
0:636

0:101
0:099

0:038
0:518

0:050
 0:674
0:651
Spain  0:331

0:049
0:636

0:101
0:099

0:038
0:518

0:050
0:449

0:252
Ireland  0:109

0:032
0:636

0:101
0:099

0:038
0:518

0:050
0:418
0:251
Notes: Column 1 denotes the country under regard. Column 2
shows the estimates for the adjustment coecient (^ ~ i). Column 3-5
summarize the PMG estimates for the (common) long-run coecients
(^ ~ k). The last column (^ ~ 
i) reports the estimated coecient for r
ext
t 1
(standard errors below coecients).
(
) denotes signicance at the
5%(1%)-level.
Table 5 reports the estimated long-run relationship as well as the country-specic
estimation results for the adjustment coecient (^ ~ i) and the "external constraint"-
variable rext
t 1 (^ ~ 
i). A Hausman test supports homogeneity of the long-run parameters
since it is not possible to reject the null of long-run homogeneity (pH = 0:34).
Again, most of the adjustment coecients are estimated signicantly negative,
where the coecient for Belgium is only signicant at the 10%-level.32 Moreover, magni-
tude and heterogeneity of the parameter estimates are similar to the estimates obtained
from the SUR estimation (see Table 2). Regarding the long-run coecients we obtain
estimates which are similar to the pooled/xed-eects estimation (see Table 3) although
we observe a larger coecient for the long rate. Joint consideration of the in
ation and
the long rate coecient yields an overall in
ation coecient clearly above 1. As some-
times encountered in the literature on Taylor rules the estimated output gap coecient
31ML-estimation was carried out using the GAUSS-program written by Y. Shin. The download is
available at http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/faculty/pesaran/public.htm.
32This result may be due to marked interest rate changes in Belgium during the ERM crisis in 1993
which we cannot observe for the other countries, see Appendix A.
18is very low (see e.g. Faust et al. 2001). Estimates for the "external constraint"-variable
(^ ~ 
i) conrm the interpretation of this variable since it signicantly enters the reaction
functions of Austria and the Netherlands (and additionally of Finland and Spain).
Again, we investigated whether our interpretation of the long rate coecient as
forward-looking component of the (overall) in
ation coecient is justied. Therefore,
we excluded the long rate from our estimation (see footnote 30). Analogously to Table 3
and 4, Table 6 summarizes the parameter estimates for dierent sets of variables and
sub-panels33, where for the adjustment coecient (^ ~ ) and the "external constraint"-
variable (^ ~ 
) we report the Mean Group (MG)- estimates.
Table 6: Pooled Mean Group Estimation 1993:1{1998:12 (Sub-Panel)
Panel ^ ~  ^ ~ 1 () ^ ~ 2 (y) ^ ~ 3 (l) ^ ~ 

all countries  0:145

0:036
0:636

0:101
0:099

0:038
0:518

0:050
0:153
0:124
without Aut/Bel/Net  0:177

0:044
0:641

0:105
0:113

0:042
0:529

0:052
0:151
0:143
all countries  0:077

0:013
1:171

0:107
0:377

0:072
  0:149
0:097
without Aut/Bel/Net  0:082

0:016
1:241

0:126
0:486

0:097
  0:165
0:102
Notes: Column 1 denotes the panel under regard. Column 2 shows the es-
timate for the adjustment coecient (^ ~ ). Column 3-5 summarize the PMG
estimates for the (common) long-run coecients (^ ~ k). The last column (^ ~ 
) re-
ports the estimated coecient for r
ext
t 1 (standard errors below coecients).
 denotes signicance at the 1%-level.
In fact, when excluding the long rate we obtain reaction coecients for in
ation
and the output gap which are directly comparable in magnitude with the estimates
usually obtained for Taylor rules (see Sauer and Sturm 2003, p. 10). This is dierent
from our ndings within the SUR framework (see Table 3). Furthermore, the exclusion
of the long rate changes the magnitude of the adjustment parameter which we also
did not observe for the pooled/xed-eects estimation. Moreover, excluding Austria,
Belgium and the Netherlands only marginally changes the estimates for the long-run
coecients.
Thus, the reaction functions estimated within the PMG framework exhibit qualita-
tively slightly dierent characteristics compared to the reaction functions obtained from
the pooled/xed-eects estimation: we observe a higher overall speed of adjustment for
the estimation with the long rate and no signicant impact of the "external constraint"-
variable. Furthermore, the estimates for the long-run coecients are largely unaected
by the formation of the panel.
33We abandon to present less plausible PMG estimation results for a sub-panel including only three
countries.
19These qualitatively dierent characteristics may have several causes: within the
PMG framework we impose a smaller degree of homogeneity on the dynamics across
countries. Simply averaging speeds of adjustment might increase the in
uence of out-
liers (e.g. Portugal) compared to the pooled estimation. At the same time, it is one
property of the PMG estimator to be robust against outliers with regard to the long-run
coecients (see Pesaran et al. 1999, p. 629).
Overall, the results for the long-run coecients are very close across the alternative
estimation approaches (with the whole set of variables). In contrast, we observe dif-
ferences for the adjustment coecient which implies dierent degrees of interest rate
smoothing determined across the approaches. However, which panel approach is more
appropriate for describing interest rate dynamics since 1999 remains an empirical ques-
tion which will be addressed in the next section.
3.4 Out-of-Sample Forecasts
In order to evaluate the ability of the panel reaction functions to describe actual in-
terest rate dynamics since 1999 we performed out-of-sample forecasts over the period
1999:1{2002:12. A crucial issue with regard to the forecast comparison is how to achieve
comparability between equations, especially with regard to the short-run dynamics. In
order to focus on the structural (long-run) relationship, we opted for a parsimonious
inclusion of short-run dynamics. In particular, we decided according to the following
rule: we only included signicant lagged dierences of the endogenous variable. More-
over, the "external constraint"-variable (rext
t 1) was always included in the reaction
function.34 Finally, we omitted the constant which was always estimated insigni-
cantly (see footnote 28). This ensures that forecast improvements are not simply due
to intercept shifts but result from equations' dierent abilities to capture interest rate
dynamics.
Table 7 reports Root Mean Squared Forecast Errors (RMSFE) of the alternative
error-correction equations. In particular, we focus on the comparison between the panel
reaction functions and the reaction function estimated with aggregated data (AGG).
We compare the reaction functions for dierent formations of the panel either inclu-
ding all countries (PMG(10)/SUR(10)), seven countries (PMG(7)/SUR(7)) or three
countries (SUR(3)). We observe a similar forecast performance of the aggregated equa-
tion and the PMG-equations for short-run forecasts (1-/4-months) while the SUR(10)-
and the SUR(3)-equation are outperformed by the aggregated equation. In terms of the
RMSFE-criterion, the PMG-equations outperform the aggregated equation from hori-
34Note, that from 1999 onwards we use the U.S. Federal Funds Rate as "external constraint"-variable.
20Table 7: Out-of-Sample Forecasts 1999:1{2002:12 (RMSFE)
h AGG PMG(10) PMG(7) SUR(10) SUR(7) SUR(3)
1 0.158 0.171 0.172 0:189
 0.179 0:210

4 0.341 0.368 0.355 0.515 0.439 0.552
8 0.630 0.518 0.485 0.858 0.695 0.899
12 0.867 0:570
 0:516
 1.100 0.850 1.117
18 1.096 0:603
 0:543
 1.307 0.920 1.196
24 1.183 0:579
 0:561
 1.266 0:726
 0:889

Notes: Column 1 denotes the forecast horizon under regard. Column 2 shows the RMSFE-value
for the equation estimated with aggregated data while column 3-4 report the respective results for
the PMG-equations for the whole panel and the sub-panel, respectively. Column 5 summarizes the
RMSFE-results for the SUR estimation with all countries. The last two columns report the results
for forecasts of dierent sub-panel equations (see Table 4).
(
) denotes signicance of forecast
dierences compared to the aggregated equation (AGG) at the 5%(1%)-level (Diebold-Mariano-test).
zon h = 8 onwards. According to the test proposed by Diebold and Mariano (1995) this
forecast improvement even becomes signicant at h = 12 where the PMG(7)-equation
does slightly better than the PMG(10)-equation. In contrast, the SUR(10)-equation
remains outperformed by the aggregated equation over all forecast horizons which also
holds for the SUR(3)-equation except for h = 24. This indicates that, within the SUR
framework, neither considering all countries nor focusing on the three largest economies
contributes to retrieve a reaction function which captures interest rate dynamics since
1999 appropriately.
However, looking at the SUR(7)-equation, which was estimated after having ex-
cluded Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands from the panel, we observe a good fore-
cast performance relative to the aggregated equation: in terms of the RMSFE the
SUR(7)-equation performs better from h = 12 onwards with a signicant forecast im-
provement at h = 24. In particular, the SUR(7)-equation seems to benet from the
signicant impact of the long rate compared to the SUR(3)-equation.
Summarizing, three major points can be retrieved from our forecast comparison:
rst, the estimation of European reaction functions within a panel framework especially
pays o with regard to medium- and long-horizon forecasts. In the short-run we observe
a similar performance between the equation based on aggregated data and the preferred
panel reaction functions.35 Second, equations based on panels including all countries
or only three countries are outperformed by equations based on on a panel including
seven countries. On the one hand, this seems to conrm the intuition that we cannot
retrieve valuable information for simulating a union-wide monetary policy before 1999
35This might be mainly due to the fact that none of the equations is able to outperform a "naive"
random walk forecast signicantly for horizons smaller than h = 4 (not reported).
21from countries which did not pursue an active monetary policy. On the other hand,
this indicates that we can improve the predictive ability of our reaction functions by
considering more than the three largest European economies.
Finally, it is remarkable that error-correction equations obtained from the PMG
estimation exhibit the best forecasting properties although the estimate for the output
gap coecient is very small.36 This seems to conrm the conjecture that an indepen-
dent role of the output gap within the reaction function is only justied as long as it
contains information about future in
ation (see Favero and Rovelli 1999). Since within
our specication in
ationary expectations are mainly captured by the long rate, the
informational content of output gap developments seems to become negligible.
3.5 The Importance of National Developments:
A Reverse 'Counterfactual Experiment'
A 'counterfactual experiment' often performed in the literature on reaction functions for
the Euro Area is to apply a historical policy rule estimated for the German Bundesbank
up to 1998 to European data since 1999 (see Clarida et al. 1998; Faust et al. 2001;
Smant 2002). The purpose of this exercise is to assess the appropriateness of a single
"Bundesbank rule" for describing interest rate setting since 1999 by comparing the
implied interest rate path with actual interest rates. Finding that a single "Bundesbank
rule" is not appropriate for describing interest rate setting by the ECB is sometimes
interpreted as support for the viewpoint that European monetary policy is based on a
"collective" rather than a single-country experience (Mihov 2001, p. 395). In a similar
fashion we now perform a reverse 'counterfactual experiment': having retrieved an
error-correction equation which performs well in describing short-term interest rate
dynamics since 1999 (PMG(7)-equation) we apply the area-wide reaction function to
country-specic data since 1999. Comparing the implied interest rate paths with the
actual EONIA-rate might shed some light on the question whether European monetary
policy has potentially reacted to national developments (see also Heinemann and H ufner
2002; von Hagen and Br uckner 2002).
In addition to considering the whole out-of-sample period 1999:1{2002:12 we focus
on two characteristic episodes where, for selected countries, we can observe extreme de-
viations of national in
ation from area-wide HICP-in
ation (see Figure 2): Portuguese
in
ation extraordinarily increased compared to area-wide in
ation since 2000:3 where
the peak was reached in 2001:3 before Portuguese in
ation began to decrease. At the
36The superior forecast performance of the PMG-equations even remains when comparing equations
where the short-run dynamics, especially the impact of the U.S. Federal Funds Rate, are excluded.
22Figure 2: National Divergence in In
ation Rates
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same time, French in
ation permanently remained below area-wide in
ation. The
second episode under regard is the period 2001:12{2002:12 where German in
ation
substantially remained below while, at the same time, Portuguese in
ation was clearly
above area-wide in
ation. Applying the PMG(7)-panel reaction function to French,
German and Portuguese data, respectively, and comparing the implied interest rate
paths with the EONIA-rate we will get an impression whether, in the short-run, na-
tional developments potentially mattered for interest rate setting. If an equation based
on national data outperforms the equation with area-wide data in out-of-sample fore-
casts this might indicate that interest rate setting was in fact in
uenced by national
developments.37 Table 8 reports the RMSFE-results for short-run forecasts up to
horizon h = 4.
Some interesting results can be retrieved from the forecast comparison. First, con-
sidering the whole sample period there is no indication for an overall national "bias"
in interest rate setting: though Portuguese in
ation was permanently above area-wide
in
ation the interest rate path implied when applying the PMG(7)-equation to Por-
tuguese data does (signicantly) weaker in describing the EONIA-rate than the path
implied when using area-wide data. This also holds for the case when using French data
although the dierences in forecast accuracy are not signicant. Though we observe a
slightly better performance when using German rather than area-wide data, we do not
37We emphasize, that with our exercise we do not claim that monetary policy was conducted in favor
of one specic country. In fact, we focus on selected countries since they exhibited extreme developments
with regard to the in
ation rate. Thereby, these national developments potentially served as indicator
for future (area-wide) price developments.
23Table 8: Out-of-Sample Forecasts: Area-Wide vs. National Data (RMSFE)
1999 : 1   2002 : 12 2000 : 03   2001 : 04 2001 : 12   2002 : 12
h AW Por Fra Ger AW Por Fra AW Por Ger
1 0.172 0:275
 0.184 0:158 0.190 0.148 0:256
 0.138 0:299
 0:053

2 0.242 0:470
 0.266 0:206
 0.265 0.229 0:400
 0.236 0:522
 0:073

3 0.307 0:631
 0.339 0:252
 0.356 0.284 0:543
 0.322 0:701
 0:092

4 0.355 0:758
 0.397 0.285 0.406 0.292 0:638
 0.393 0:848
 0:104

Notes: Column 1 shows the forecast horizon under regard. Columns 2-5 show RMSFE-values
based on the PMG(7)-equation applied to area-wide (AW) or national data. Columns 6-8 and 9-11
show the respective results for selected sub-samples.
(
) denotes signicance of forecast dierences
compared to the area-wide equation (AW) at the 5%(1%)-level (Diebold-Mariano-test).
interpret this as an overall national "bias": German and area-wide in
ation were very
close up to the end of 2001 and signicant forecast improvements over the whole period
(1999:1{2002:12) are only due to developments in 2002 which will be discussed later.38
However, when considering the rst episode (2000:3{2001:4) we do remarkably bet-
ter in describing the EONIA-rate in terms of the RMSFE-criterion when using Por-
tuguese data. Though the dierences in forecast accuracy are not signicant the interest
rate path implied when using Portuguese data is closer to the EONIA-rate. Visual in-
spection conrms this result: Figure 3 shows that the EONIA-rate was mostly above
the (one-step-ahead) interest rate path obtained from area-wide data. In particular,
though area-wide in
ation decreased in 2001:2 interest rates increased { potentially in
order to react to high CPI-in
ation in e.g. Portugal39 which reached its peak in 2001:3.
Consequently, with an EONIA-path lying above the implied area-wide level there is no
indication for a French "bias" at all: applying the PMG(7)-equation to area-wide data
is signicantly better than using French data.
Regarding the second episode (2001:12{2002:12) we obtain a surprising result: the
equation with German data clearly outperforms the equation with area-wide data
which, in contrast, clearly outperforms the Portuguese equation. This distinct fore-
cast improvement when applying the reaction function to German data within the
period under regard is also responsible for the slightly superior "overall" performance
detected above. Taken together, this indicates that during this episode European mone-
tary policy potentially was in
uenced by German price developments though in
ation
in Portugal was above area-wide in
ation.
38In fact we observe equal forecast accuracy using area-wide and German data when the end of the
forecast period is xed at 2001:12.
39Over this period, in
ation rates of comparable magnitude could be observed for Spain.
24Figure 3: Implied Interest Rate Paths: Area-Wide vs. National Data
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A possible interpretation of our results is that in times of increasing in
ationary
pressure arising from national developments monetary policy in fact reacted to country-
specic conditions with setting interest rate on a higher level than implied by area-wide
in
ation. In contrast, without distinct in
ationary pressure arising from particular
countries interest rates are sometimes even kept below the path implied by area-wide
in
ation { perhaps fearing de
ationary tendencies in some of the Member States.40
Overall, the results from our reverse 'counterfactual experiment' may be taken as indi-
cation that the ECB potentially used national developments as indicator for in
ationary
or de
ationary tendencies which were { in line with a forward-looking policy { answered
with distinct interest rate changes.
4 Concluding Remarks
Estimating interest rate reaction functions for the Euro Area is still hampered by the
short time span since the conduct of a single monetary policy. In this paper we have
shown that estimating a historical interest rate reaction function for the Euro Area
within a panel framework is a powerful alternative to the common use of aggregated,
"synthetic" data.
In particular, by exploiting the cross-section dimension of a multi-country panel
including actual Member States of the EMU we obtained very precise estimates for
the coecients entering the policy rule. Moreover, estimation seems to benet from
accounting for cross-country heterogeneity with regard to adjustment and short-run
dynamics in advance of 1999.
40This is in line with ndings of Surico (2003) who describes ECB behavior by a state-dependent,
asymmetric reaction function. However, he does not nd asymmetric behavior with regard to price
developments (in
ation/de
ation).
25Our preferred panel reaction function is a Taylor-type rule in line with the Taylor-
principle. However, we obtain an output gap coecient which is lower than usually
found in the literature. We argue that this is mainly due to the inclusion of the long-
term nominal bond rate which is assumed to capture changes in long-run in
ationary
expectations. According to out-of-sample forecasts the preferred panel reaction function
outperforms a corresponding equation estimated with aggregated data, especially at
longer forecast horizons.
Overall, our results indicate that as long as time series are considered as too short
for building the analysis exclusively on data since 1999 estimating a historical reaction
function within a panel framework might be advantageous compared to the use of
aggregated, "synthetic" data.
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